HTS’s Self-Proclaimed Accomplishments in 2022

On January 1, HTS’s municipal governance apparatus the Administration of the Liberated Areas released a series of infographics (below) about self-proclaimed achievements over the past year. Instead of framing it as achievements for HTS or the Salvation Government (the civilian-led executive governing body in HTS-controlled areas) for that matter, the post discusses these achievements as ones for the Syrian revolution. This is because from HTS’s perspective they view everything that is being done in its territories as for the benefit of the revolution and that the revolution is not about a particular individual or faction, but everyone. Thus, this is line with HTS’s broader messaging strategy in recent years since it began to co-opt the language of the revolution. Of course, other groups and activists that are against and disagree with HTS would argue otherwise, but this is how HTS projects the issue. Alongside the infographics just released, I will also provide more primary sources on each self-proclaimed achievement and note anything specific about it, if a comment and analysis is warranted.

January: Formation of the new government

Every year since the Salvation Government (SG) was formed in 2017, there has been an elite-led process amongst the consultative council, tribal elders, and key town and displaced notables, whereby a prime minister is nominated to manage those in charge of the various ministries that make up the SG. These ministries currently include Interior; Justice; Endowments, Proselytization, and Guidance; Education; Health; Local Administration and Services; Economy and Resources; Development and Humanitarian Affairs; Higher Education; and Agriculture and Irrigation.

January: Rehabilitation of the Bab al-Hawa – Halab Road

The opening of the rehabilitated road was noteworthy because it was the first time that the leader of HTS, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, was publicly inaugurating a services-related project instead of the usual meetings he would have with military officials or notables. This came on the heels of him in November 2021 appearing at an emergency session of the General Shura Council to alleviate the bread price crisis at the time. Thus, the end of 2021 and through 2022 saw more appearances of Jawlani acting as a political figure alongside his more traditional role as the overall military commander for HTS and its fight against the Assad regime and rival factions in the insurgency. More of these types of actions by Jawlani are touted as other achievements below too. During this inauguration, Jawlani spoke and said this achievement is a “success of the revolution,” and that it should be celebrated by anyone who supports the revolution. One of the more interesting quotes that Jawlani said during this speech too was that: “freedom comes from military strength… and dignity comes from economic and investment projects, through which the people, and the citizens, live a dignified life that befits Muslims.” Therefore, according to Jawlani, each of these projects matters because it is a “step towards Damascus, and a step towards Aleppo, and step towards all the rest of Syria.”

February: Solving the murder of the two children in Atme

This is likely highlighted to showcase the competence of the Interior Ministry’s police force and investigative prowess from the perspective of HTS.

March: Opening of the Military College

I’m not quite sure why they noted that the Military College was opened in March 2022 since it was originally announced in December 2021. The only thing noteworthy about March for the Military College was that the college had its final exam for its first batch of cadets. Plus, the above image is from September 2022 when the Military College had a graduation ceremony. Nevertheless, the announcement of the Military College was another step in the professionalization of HTS’s fighting forces and structure from one that was involved in terrorism (mainly when it was Jabhat al-Nusrah and Jabhat al-Fatah al-Sham) and insurgency to a formalized body that could eventually lead to a Ministry of Defense within the SG.

June: Bab al-Hawa Industrial City

The Bab al-Hawa Industrial City was originally announced in mid-September 2021, however, the development of the area started being built in June 2022. The most recent aerial update of its progress is from January 4, 2023 (bottom image).

July: The Irrigation Project From ‘Ayn al-Zarqa’

The project will pump water from ‘Ayn al-Zarqa’ to Sahl al-Ruj. This was another governance project that Jawlani inaugurated. During this inauguration, Jawlani had another speech. One of the points that Jawlani made was that there needed to be investment in irrigation as this is the biggest barrier to increasing agricultural production. Jawlani also laid out a whole agricultural plan, which I wrote about here, among other issues.

August: The Idlib Book Fair

It took place from August 18-25, 2022.

September: Issuance of ID Cards

Another mechanism that further consolidates HTS’s governance project through bureaucratic measures to gain a better understanding of who is actually living in its territory. While some might view this as a way to better spy on local residents, there is also another plausible reason for this: the transient nature of those that come and go through HTS’s territory, especially with the Syrian National Army territories. Plus, 3/4 of the population in HTS-controlled areas are displaced individuals from different parts of Syria. Thus, from HTS’s perspective it would make sense to formalize this process.

September: Honoring Memorizers of the Qur’an

This is through the private Dar al-Wahi al-Sharif Qur’anic school, which is run by Hisham al-Shaykh, the original leader of HTS when it formed in January 2017, prior to Jawlani retaking the mantle in October 2017.

October: Rehabilitation of the Bab al-Hawa – Jindires Road

Work on upgrading this road actually began in late August 2022. What’s noteworthy about this road is that when it first began being changed from dirt to asphalt, HTS did not actually control the town of Jindires. This was the first possible indication of HTS’s interest in eventually taking it over from Syrian National Army (SNA) factions, which HTS eventually attempted to takeover in mid-October 2022. While Turkey eventually forced HTS out, it is believed that secretly HTS still has a presence there and acts as shadow rulers via a puppet SNA faction.

October: Supporting the Education File

This occurred at the tenth session of the General Shura Council, whereby Jawlani made another appearance. Other key leaders in the Salvation Government spoke on improving the educational sector including the Prime Minister of the SG Ali Kida and the Ministers of Education and Higher Education. They sought to interrogate problems in the educational sector in the liberated areas. During Jawlani’s speech at the session, he opened by focusing on the education process, which Jawlani views as “the foundation for any renaissance of societies that have gone through wars and crises.” Jawlani sees this issue as a generational project: “The real revolution is bringing up an educated generation capable of managing itself, and of bringing up children on a high standard for the benefit of the whole community.” Jawlani is self-aware and argues that it will take a long time for this to develop, and “cannot be solved in one session or one month.” Thus, Jawlani calls for the creation of a strategic plan for education since 200,000 people in the liberated areas have dropped out of school, leading to potential “illiteracy that leads to ignorance, which is a precursor to crime, unemployment, begging, and many other things.”

November: Idlib Municipal Stadium

The new stadium for various sports activities was inaugurated.

November: Re-opening the National Hospital

This is seen as a major victory since the prior national hospital in Idlib had been bombed by the Assad regime in late May 2016, a heinous tactic the regime has used against civilian healthcare facilities all over Syria. Interestingly, HTS’s Dr. Mazhar al-Ways was at the dedication. Currently, he is a key ideologue for HTS and also is on the SG’s Ministry of Justice’s Supreme Judicial Committee. However, when he was younger, he received a medical degree from Damascus University, hence why he’s still described as a doctor whenever mentioned in HTS materials.

December: Winter Warmth Campaign

This was yet another campaign that Jawlani was a part of to announce greater assistance for those living in IDP camps ahead of the rugged winter weather. While this campaign was announced in mid-December 2022, the efforts to help individuals is still ongoing and is highlighted almost daily by the SG’s Ministry of Development and Humanitarian Affairs. These efforts have also been funneled through HTS’s General Zakat Commission to assist the super needy amongst the IDPs. It should also be noted that this campaign comes a month-and-a-half earlier than last winter’s ‘Your Warmth Is Our Duty’ campaign in late January 2022. Suggesting that HTS has learned to get ahead of the issue this time around before there is an actual crisis. During the most recent announcement, Jawlani said that these provisions will help 15,000 families and provide necessary resources and funds. Jawlani also framed this campaign as a way to distinguish HTS’s governance with the mendacity of the Assad regime: “The blessed Syrian revolution, based on strength and dignity, continues to care for the people, god willing, to not enable the criminal regime, and to support the people despite all the bombing, destruction, and explosives campaigns.” Therefore, according to Jawlani, despite the regime’s failures, HTS will continue to strive to build the “Syria of the future.”

December: The Opening of Clock Square

This can be seen as in line with broader “beautification” projects to re-establish a sense of normalcy within the cities and villages of HTS-controlled areas by making the design of the central corridors have a new aesthetic that could make locals proud since they built it themselves and can now take advantage of the urban space beyond the rubble that the Assad regime created through its campaign of destruction.

HTS Ideologues Respond to the Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan

Abu al-Fatah al-Firghali

تحررت أفغانستان وعادت لتحكم #بشريعة_الرحمن
الله أكبر ولله الحمد والمنة.
اللهم بارك في رجال #طالبان الذين صدقوا ما عاهدوا الله عليه و #ما_بدلوا تبديلًا.
نصر طالبان درس للأمة في الثبات على الحق إلى تحقق النصر،
ودرس في أن من يتوكل على الله لا يقدر عليه أحد ولو اجتمع عليه الإنس والجن جميعًا.

🖋تأويل البعض انتصار جنود الله #طالبان بأن هذا اتفاق مع أمريكا لأجل الصين … إلخ من السفسطة أمر قديم منذ عهد النبي ﷺ والخلفاء من بعده إلى الآن، حين يحاول من لا يوقن بالغيب وقدرة الله تأويل كل كرامة أو نصر من الله بأسباب مادية، أو يحاول من يريد الزيغ عن الحق بحجة الاستضعاف أن يجد مخرجًا.
وأنصح بعدم الانشغال بالرد عليهم فالحق أبلج والباطل لجلج

‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Mahdi

تحية من مجاهدي الشام لإخوانهم الطالبان
لقد قاتلتم عشرين عاما تحالفا يضم ٤٠ دولة بقيادة أمريكا..
صبر وبذل ووحدة صف وتوكل على الله
نبارك لطالبان انتصاراتهم
كما نبارك للشعب الأفغاني
وللمسلمين في كل مكان هذا النصر الكبير..
ونفرح بذلك قال الله: (وَيَوْمَئِذٍ يَفْرَحُ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ بِنَصْرِ اللَّه)
اللهم كما أدخلت الفرحة على الأفغان
أدخل الفرحة على السوريين بهزيمة بشار بوتن وخامنئي ومليشياتهم.

Dr. Mazhar al-Ways

📌قبل عشرين عاماً وعندما حصل الانهيار في أفغانستان ومن حزني نظمت قصيدة شعر أذكر فيها مآثر الطالبان، واليوم ومع هذا الفتح العظيم فقد جادت قريحتي بأبيات جديدة من الشعر أعبر فيها عن حبي وتقديري وعن أسباب النصر لهذه الثلة، وأبتهل إلى الله أن يكرر هذا الفتح في الشام الحبيبة،
أهدي هذه الأبيات إلى طالبان والشعب الأفغاني وإلى جميع الشعوب المظلومة وعلى رأسهم شعبنا السوري المكلوم، أقول فيها مستعيناً بالله:
أحــب الطالبــــان لأن فيـــهم
                   صـــلابة مسلــم حــر أصيــل
فتعظيم الشـــريعة رأسُ مالٍ
                   بفقــه أبي حنـــيفة والأصــول
فـلا رأي الخـــوارج فــي غلــو
                   ولا التمييـع مـن فكـر دخيـــل
ولكــن ســنة المختــار تعلـــو
                   على كـــل المنــاهج بالدليـــل
كأن القـــوم قــدبُعِثوا إليــنا
                   ليحيوا عـزة الماضـي الجميل
أسـود في الحـروب لها زئيـر
                   بصيحات الجهاد على السبيل
 بصــف واحــد ولــهم أميــر
                   فـــلا فوضى ولاقــالٍ وقيــلِ
فيارب العبـــاد نريـد نصراً
                    تمــن به على الشــام النبيـــل
كما أكرمتهم أكــــرم بــــلاداً
                    تتوق لكســر بشـــــار العمــيل
فإن النصــر منك بغيــر ريب
                    تجــود به علـى العبـــد الذليل
ولكـن الوعـــود تريد ســـعياً
                    لتحصيل من المــولى الجـليل

والحمد لله رب العالمين.

📌يقول التاريخ أن المحتل سيرحل وأن عملاءه سيلحقون به_طبعاً إذا سمح لهم الوقت بذلك-
سنةٌ ماضية طالما هنالك شعب مقاوم يريد الحرية وينشد الاستقلال، تحررت أفغانستان وستتحرر سوريا والعراق وفلسطين بإذن الله، فلا يضيع حق وراءه مُطالِب.

Abu Mariyah al-Qahtani

📌‏أبارك للأمة للإسلامية انتصار إخواننا الطلبة على المحتلين وأذنابهم في في أفغانستان وتعازينا للخونة والمنافقين ، انتصار طالبان انتصار للمسلمين انتصار لأهل السنة انتصار لجميع المظلومين ، عندما ينتصر الحق على الباطل يفرح المؤمنون بنصر الله والله قوي عزيز .

📌يتسائل البعض لماذا نحن نهتم بنصر طالبان؟

نفرح لفرح المسلمين ونحزن لحزنهم هي لغة الجسد الواحد.

يطير مدعي الإنسانية وحقوق الإنسان عندما يجدون من يغازلهم ويمتدح اكذوبتهم.

نعم افرح عندما ترتفع رايات الإسلام ويذل الشرك وأهله نعم أفرح عندما يخرج المحتل الذي دمر بلدان المسلمين وسلمها للمجرمين نعم افرح بهزيمة امريكا أمام الطلبة، وانتظر هزيمتها في العراق عندما اراها تخرج وأذناب إيران معها يخرجون من بلاد الرافدين.

كيف لا افرح وارى أمريكا التي ارهبت الحكام الخونة وارهبت المنهزمين الذين كادوا يعبدونها، يالها من فرحة قر الله اعيننا بها قبل ان نموت نشاهدهم ينسحبون من بلد مسلم وتسقط أكذوبة هوليود وجنديهم الكوني المنمق.


ذُهلت من تفكير بعض الذين كنت أظنهم نُخبًا فإذا بهم نُكب على الأمة الإنهزام والخنوع والتيه في فهم الواقع جعلهم يعيشون نظرية المؤامرة بكل تفاصيلها، ويرددون الشعارات التي أطلقها الغرب واليوم كفر بها “كالإرهاب والتصنيف” #طالبان شرف لكل الأمة سيرويه التاريخ ويتجاهل تحليلاتكم الساذجة

Jihad ‘Isa al-Shaykh

تعلم أصحاب المناهج المنحرفة أن لا نصر و لا تمكين للشعوب المقهورة إلا بالجهاد في سبيل الله و أن طريق الجهاد و إن طال فنهايته نصر بإذن الله 

تعلم أصحاب نظرية المؤمرة و النظرة السودوية أنه بالصبر و الجهاد و الإلتحام مع الشعب مع الثبات على المبادئ نستطيع أن نحرر البلاد و نحكم الشريعة رغم أنف الغزاة

Eid al-Adha Greetings From Entities Associated With HTS and the Salvation Government

Salvation Government

Majlis al-Qaba’il wa-l-‘Asha’ir al-Suriyah

Green Energy

Idlib University Hospital

Administration of the Liberated Areas – Central Region

Salvation GovernmentAwqaf, Da’wah, and Guidance Ministry

General Administration for the Checkpoints

Administration of the Liberated Areas – Jisr al-Shaghur Region

Salvation Government – Shura Council

Saraya al-Muqawamah al-Sha’abiyah

Zajl Transportation

Administration of the Liberated Areas – Northern Region

Bab al-Hawa Border Crossing

General Security Service

Administration of the Liberated Areas – Atme Region

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

Dar al-Wahi al-Sharif Li-l-Qur’an al-Karim al-‘Ulum al-Shari’ah

Idlib University

Supreme Council for Issuing Fatwas

al-Huda Dawa Center

Administration of the Liberated Areas – Idlib Region

Administration of the Liberated Areas – Ariha Region

The General Commission for Zakat

Maktab al-Da’wah wa-l-Irshad al-Nisa’i

Mashru’a Ibnat al-Islam

Administration of the Liberated Areas – Harim Region

Majlis al-Salah al-‘Am fi al-Muharar

Abu al-Fatah al-Firghali

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham – Military Wing

Administration of the Liberated Areas – Sarmada Region

Who Is Abu Ahmad al-Zakur? HTS’s Liaison to the Syrian National Army

Previously, I wrote about Jaysh al-Qa’qa’ and military ways Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is attempting to infiltrate and potentially takeover in the future opposition areas in northern Syria outside the control of HTS. Yet, HTS also has diplomatic efforts to engage actors within the Syrian National Army. In particular, in Afrin and Azaz.

According to Muzamjir al-Sham, the individual that Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani has given this undertaking to goes by Abu Ahmad al-Zakur (though his real name is Jihad ‘Isa al-Shaykh). In late June, Muzamjir al-Sham then provided a biography of who this person is. This, together with other leaks of information in the past month or two regarding HTS maneuvers locally, led HTS leaders and supporters online to put out a piece on Muzamjir trying to discredit him. In line with this, Jihad ‘Isa al-Shaykh then posted his own biography of himself online to try and clarify the situation. In light of Muzamjir’s disclosure, al-Shaykh then posted his own photo of himself, though with his face blurred out of his trip to Azaz. Trying to show that what he and HTS were doing wasn’t quite in the shadows, but legitimate engagement. Yet this wasn’t enough for Muzamjir who then leaked a photo of al-Shaykh with his entire face showing.

Nevertheless, between the two accounts given on al-Zakur’s biography we can triangulate between them to try and garner a better understanding of who he is. Below are edited translations of what both individuals put out.

Muzamjir’s Biography of al-Zakur

Jihad ‘Isa al-Sheikh (Abu Ahmad al-Zakur), is from al-Nairab area in the countryside of Aleppo. His family is from the al-Baqara clan. His jihadi journey began following the US invasion of Iraq when al-Zakur began attending religious and jihadist sermons and lessons in the al-Sakhur neighborhood in Aleppo city from Mahmud Agassi (better known as Abu al-Qa’qa’), who turned out to be linked to Syrian regime intelligence. Through this, al-Zakur became acquittances with ‘Umar Khattab, who was appointed by Abu Mus’ab al-Zaraqwi as an official for al-Qaeda in Aleppo following his baya to Usamah Bin Ladin. Al-Zakur became his personal driver. Following this, he moved up the ranks to work in a guesthouse in Aleppo for an al-Qaeda figure named ‘Afash, where they helped smuggle Syrians and foreign fighters to go join the fight in Iraq. Eventually, the Syrian regime would arrest ‘Afash’s cell, including al-Zakur, who would end up in Sednaya prison. There he claimed to have higher leadership positions amongst the jihadis in prison than what was reality. Al-Zakur would spend a number of years in prison until he was released sometime in 2012 after Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN) announced itself.

Following his release, al-Zakur was appointed as deputy emir of JN in the Aleppo sector. At that time, ‘Abd Allah Sanad was the emir of Aleppo, but then al-Zakur replaced him and Sanad became his deputy. Al-Zakur allegedly had a prominent role in encouraging al-Jawlani to rebel against the Islamic State’s (IS) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and pushed for openly giving baya to al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri. Through this, al-Zakur had a working relationship with the so-called ‘Khurasan Group,’ the external operations cell within JN. Yet he apparently treated them poorly, which was one of the reasons why the head of the ‘Khurasan Group’ Muhsin al-Fadhli left JN.

After the dispute with IS, JN was severely lacking resources, apparently only having $100,000 in its finance office, while al-Zakur in the Aleppo sector allegedly had millions of dollars due to looting, theft, and corruption. This led Jawlani to appoint him the head of JN’s economic file. Though he was moved off this assignment since he apparently had a dispute with Abu Hajr al-Himsi and Abu Hasan Taftanaz, who both had great influence in JN at the time. Al-Zakur was reassigned to be the emir of the borders. While he was in this position that is when the Italian women journalists were kidnapped in Atarib with the participation of Harakat Nur al-Din al-Zanki. Al-Zakur also became responsible for the smuggling activities in and out of Turkey, effectively establishing a border mafia, which has since been transformed and run by civilian merchants as a front. Yet due to al-Zakur’s corruption and continued pressure from Abu Hajr al-Himsi and other HTS leaders, al-Zakur alongside his colleague Sanad resigned from the organization. This was around the time HTS went after various revolutionary factions.

Yet, Jawlani apparently liked him so much he ended up tapping him again for important positions within HTS. First, he became the commander of Jaysh Halab within HTS’s military infrastructure and then later responsible for relations with the Syrian National Army. In particular, he has close relations with the Sulayman Shah Division and holds continuous meetings in the Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield areas. The end goal is to eventually overtake the Syrian National Army and control their areas and take all the spoils for Jawlani and the leadership of HTS.

Jihad ‘Isa al-Shaykh’s Autobiography

My full name is Jihad Bin ‘Isa Bin ‘Ali Bin ‘Isa Bin Shaykh Bin Muhammad Bin ‘Abd Allah Bin Hasan Bin Musa Bin Hamdan Bin Muhammad Bin Amir Hamzah (with lineage related to al-Husayn Bin ‘Ali Bin Abi Talib). I come from the al-Bawasi clan, one of the clans of the al-Baqara Hashimi tribe. My father, Shaykh ‘Isa al-Asi Abu ‘Ali, is one of the faces of the tribe and of the city of Aleppo. My father is the owner of al-Shahba Poultry, Feed, and Fish Institution, which is one of the largest institutions in this specialization in Syria. It was built in 1987. I grew up in a strict tribal environment of Arab customs and traditions. I studied in school until the ninth grade.

I later joined the lessons and episodes of Abu al-Qa’qa’, who deceived us as he deceived many in Aleppo until we exposed him and turned against him at the beginning of the invasion of Iraq. Then he was killed several years later by the brothers Ahmad Kassara and Bassam Zayrbani. At the beginning of the invasion of Iraq, we, the youth of Aleppo, joined with Ansar al-Sunnah, then Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad. The latter was Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s organization, who gave baya to Usamah Bin Ladin, which therefore officially turned Zarqawi’s organization into al-Qaeda.

I was responsible for guest accommodations and coordination in Syria. I invested in that work with all my relationships, farms, and my family’s cars. And brothers who are still alive today testify to this, as rarely a brother passed through to Iraq without passing through us. Until the arrest of my uncle and my friend Zakaria ‘Afash, then I got to know ‘Umar Khattab, whom I worked with in my capacity as responsible for him and for the rest of the brothers in Aleppo. In the service of the mujahidin brothers is an honor, but I did not work as a driver for anyone. Then after a while, our brother ‘Umar Khattab was killed in a clash with the infidels in Da’il. After ‘Umar was killed, I became responsible for managing the work for a good period until I fell into an ambush in al-Firdaws neighborhood in Aleppo and was arrested and transferred to the State Security Branch between Aleppo and Damascus for a period of 8 months, then the Palestine Branch for 4 months.

This is where I met again with Zakaria ‘Afash for 4 years, including a year in the Palestine Branch. In Sadnaya prison, I was the official for al-Qaeda youth. I was also the military official in the prison insurgency that lasted for more than eight months and in which Zakaria ‘Afash, Abu Hafs al-Hadidi, and nearly fifty of the best brothers were killed. With the beginning of the Syrian revolution, the Assad regime abolished the Emergency Law and the State Security Court, after which we were transferred to the civil prison and we were treated as civilian prisoners, and those who left us were released accordingly by enforcing the quarter-term law, and many brothers remained in prison, killed by the regime, with the intensification of battles in 2014. This is a summary of my life before the revolution, but during it, books and volumes are required.

What to Make of This?

There are many similar details, yet they have different twists on them depending on the perspective. Whereby Muzamjir gives a negative twist to his biography and al-Shaykh provides a narrative that makes himself look good. Therefore, if you just take the specific events as such and ignore the spin, there seems to be a convergence between the two and where the truth lies. It’s too bad that al-Shaykh only shared his biography up to the beginning of the uprising and not up to the present. Though I understand for likely political and security reasons within HTS that he might not want to disclose specifics since he is still active within the theater and in the group.

Germany Charges Two Individuals for Financing HTS, Malhamah Tactical, and Junud al-Sham

On June 29, Germany charged two German nationals – Önder A. and Erman K. – for helping finance Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Malhamah Tactical, and Junud al-Sham. Önder A. was originally arrested on January 7, 2021, while Erman K. was originally arrested on February 15, 2021. Malhamah Tactical is a jihadi paramilitary unit that helps to primarily train different fighters and groups in the Syrian war. Junud al-Sham is a jihadi group, is Chechen-led, and primarily has fighters from the Caucasus region. Both Malhamah Tactical and Junud al-Sham have associated or worked with HTS in the past.

However, more recently, there have been tensions between Junud al-Sham’s leader Muslim al-Shishani and HTS’s leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani over current dynamics and the future of the jihadi project in northwest Syria.

Regarding this case, Önder A. transferred funds fifteen times to these groups between November 2017 and October 2020, while Erman K. transferred funds twenty times to these groups between August 2018 and December 2020. According to the press release, “the funds were mainly intended to finance the armed struggle and to consolidate the territory of the terrorist organizations.” It goes on to say that these two individuals “are part of an international network that has supported the terrorist activities of the HTS, Junud al-Sham, and the Malhamah Tactical in Syria from across Europe through financial donations.” These donations were apparently given to two members of Junud al-Sham and one member each of HTS and Malhamah Tactical. Part of this money went towards the maintenance of a website created by those in Syria to elicit further donations to the organizations to help fight locally.

Jaysh al-Qa’qa’: A New HTS Front Group In Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield Territory?

On Friday June 11, a new entity calling itself Jaysh al-Qa’qa’ Bin ‘Umru al-Tamimi announced itself under the command of Abu Mu’tasim Bi-Allah Zabadani.

According to a leaked audio, Zabadani claims that it is a way for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to insert itself into Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield Territory and eventually to take it over. In particular, Afrin and ‘Azaz. Those regions are currently occupied by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army.

Leaked audio

This is not necessarily surprising, since Zabadani had previously been a member of Jabhat al-Nusra in Rif Dimashq and continued to be affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham after it changed its name. According to Ugarit Post, Zabadani’s real name is Sulayman al-Dalati and is unsurprisingly originally from Zabadani in Rif Dimashq Governorate. According to the website, al-Dalati is 32 years-old, is married and has children, and was previously arrested in 2006 for allegedly killing a Christian. He was released from Sednaya prison alongside the other Islamist and jihadi prisoners in June 2011 and originally joined up with Ahrar al-Sham. He is believed to currently be based in Ma’arrat Misrin in Idlib Province.

Based on his sources, Muzajmir al-Sham claims that thus far, Jaysh al-Qa’qa only currently has 100 members. However, through inducements such as salaries of 800 Turkish liras and other forms of aid, it is foreseeable others will join up soon since the Syrian National Army reportedly is having salary issues.

Non-HTS Bodies Eulogizing Abu Khalid al-Shami

Residents of Halfaya (Hama Governorate)

al-Jabur Tribe in the Liberated North

al-Majlis al-Thawri al-‘Am for Idlib Province

Marsad al-Shamal

Alteh Village (Idlib Province)

al-Nu’im Tribe

Majlis Muhajiri of Saraqib

al-Uqaydat Tribe (Homs – Hamah)

Bani Khalid Tribe

Albu ‘Asi Clan of the al-Bakarah Tribe

Displaced Residents of Damascus and its Countryside in the Liberated North

The Syrian Tribal and Clan Council

“Idlib’s Guantanamo”: Foreign Fighters in HTS Prisons

On June 8, Muzamjir al-Sham, a popular Twitter personality who has dropped scoops related to the jihad in Syria over the years and is believed to have been affiliated with Ahrar al-Sham previously, posted a series of allegations on Twitter related to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, in particular, in relation to foreign jihadis in areas HTS controls. He also notes that Jawlani is joined by key HTS leaders in making these policies that will be discussed below, including: Abu Mariyah al-Qahtani, ‘Abd al-Rahim al-‘Atun, and Mazhar al-Ways. You can read the entire series of tweets here.

Muzamjir claims that since Jawlani left al-Qaeda’s fold he and his organization have been killing, arresting, torturing, and in even some cases allegedly extraditing wanted jihadists to foreign governments abroad. Most notably, those affiliated with Huras al-Din and Ansar al-Islam. According to Muzamjir these alleged deals with foreign intelligence services is done to try and extract money. As a consequence, he claims that this is the reason a number of al-Qaeda-related figures were also killed: such as, Abu Zayd al-Urduni, Tariq al-Turki, Faruk al-Tunisi, Abu Yunis al-Almani, Abu Mu’adh al-Faransi, and Abu ‘A’ishah al-Tajiki, among others. Likewise, Muzamjir says that there are more than 170 foreign fighters detained by HTS another 100 who were allegedly disappeared, but he cannot corroborate those individuals’ names yet. As for those imprisoned, see below for a list of some of them that Muzamjir and his sources on the ground claim to have confirmed:

Huras al-Din

Top Leaders:

  • Shaykh Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Makki (Commander of Jaysh al-Malahim)
  • Shaykh Abu Hamzah al-Dar’awi (Member of the Shura Council)
  • Sahl al-Jazrawi (Qadi)
  • Shaykh Abu Sulayman al-Libi
  • Shaykh Abu Yahya al-Jaza’iri
  • Shaykh Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Urduni
  • Shaykh Abu al-Zubayr al-Libi
  • Shaykh Abu Mariyam al-Jaza’iri
  • Shaykh Abu Dhar al-Masri
  • Shaykh Abu Basir al-Shami
  • Shaykh Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Suri
  • Shaykh Abu Ghadiyah al-Jazrawi

Military Commanders and Field Cadres:

  • Khalal al-Jawfi (Military Commander)
  • Abu ‘Umar al-Faransi (Field Commander)
  • Abu Radwan al-Turki (Field Commander)
  • Abu Mus’ab al-Turki (Field Commander)
  • Zayd al-Kurdi
  • Abu Husayn al-Turki
  • Abu Sulayman al-Mulla
  • Abu Safiyah al-Faransi
  • Abu al-Layth al-Masri
  • Abu Anas al-Masri
  • Abu Satif al-Khashir
  • Abu Bilal Daragham
  • Abu Hurayrah al-Masri

Independent Foreign Fighter Leaders and Individuals

  • Abu Usamah al-Jaza’iri
  • Abu al-Darda’ al-Jaza’iri
  • Abu Basir al-Libi
  • ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Faransi
  • ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Turki
  • Turab al-Turki
  • Jund Allah al-Turki
  • Khatab al-Irani
  • Abu Ahmad al-Libi
  • Abu Ayub al-Maghribi

French Foreign Fighters

  • ‘Umar Omsen (Leader of Firqat al-Ghuraba’)
  • Abu Basir al-Faransi (Military Commander of Firqat al-Ghuraba’)
  • Abu Salih al-Faransi (Field Commander)
  • Abu Yusuf al-Faransi
  • Sayf Allah al-Faransi
  • Musa al-Faransi
  • Abu Asiya al-Faransi

Jama’at Ansar al-Islam

  • ‘Abd al-Matin al-Kurdi (Military Commander)
  • Abu Sihab al-Kurdi (Field Commander)
  • ‘Amar al-Kurdi
  • Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shami
  • Abu ‘Ali al-Qalamuni
  • Khatab al-Turki

According to Muzamjir, while these individuals were under interrogation, so-called ‘external parties’ were involved to know more about these jihadis’ activities in Afghanistan and Europe prior to their arrival in Syria. As a consequence, he argues that Idlib is like a new version of Guantanamo Bay Prison.

Abu Khalid al-Shami Killed in Russian Airstrikes

On June 10, Abu Khalid al-Shami, the official military spokesperson for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), was killed in the village of Iblin, in the region of Jebel al-Zawaya. He was killed alongside Abu Mus’ab, HTS’s military media chief, and Mu’ataz al-Nasr, a senior HTS commander. They were killed when they were attempting to rescue and respond to Russian airstrikes that killed up to 13 individuals, including women and children. HTS confirmed their deaths in a statement released in the afternoon of June 10.

Local news outlet Syria TV released details on Abu Khalid’s biography that haven’t been published previously (as far as I’m aware). At this moment, his relatives would not provide his real name due to security concerns. However, he’s originally from Jisrin in Eastern Ghutah in Rif Dimashq. Prior to joining HTS, he went by Abu Khalid Jisrin. Prior to the 2011 revolution, he had worked locally in a sewing factory before moving to Saudi Arabia for work. He allegedly returned home in mid-March 2011 to join in with the demonstrations in his home town.

At the beginning of the uprising he joined the Jisrin Local Council, but later shifted to the military fight and was involved in many key battles in the Eastern Ghutah region from 2013-2017. Originally he was a member of Liwa’ al-Qa’qa’ Bin ‘Umru al-Tamimi, which was within Alwiyah al-Habib al-Mustafa, which was itself a part of the broader coalition al-Itihad al-Islami al-Ajnad al-Sham. This formation had an Islamist bent, most likely of the Muslim Brotherhood variety.

In mid-February 2016, the Ajnad al-Sham coalition merged with Faylaq al-Rahman, another broader coalition in the Eastern Ghutah region that was a rival to the stronger salafi group Jaysh al-Islam. However, many fighters instead decided to choose a different path when this occurred with some joining Jaysh al-Islam or al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch Jabhat al-Nusrah, which would become Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in July 2016 and later HTS in January 2017. At this point, Abu Khalid joined up with JN.

Abu Khalid moved up the ranks in various security positions until he became first the JN/JFS/HTS military commander for the Eastern Ghutah region and later the general commander for the entire group in the region. Yet, like many other fighters and fighting forces in that region, the Assad regime with the assistance of Russia and Iran via sieges and starvation campaigns over a few years eventually took over the area with a military operation between February and April 2018. As a consequence, those that did not flee or were not killed were sent via infamous green buses from Eastern Ghutah to Idlib.

Once in Idlib, Abu Khalid was assigned the role of official military spokesperson for HTS in June 2018. Since that time, Abu Khalid appeared in at least thirteen releases from HTS. Mainly releasing statements, conducting interviews with HTS’s official news agency Iba, or delivering video messages. Most of them dealt with updates on the most recent military developments as they related to HTS in the war. His most recent official public pronouncement was a statement released in late March 2021 responding to the latest round of Russian airstrikes on various installations and infrastructure in Idlib.

One among a number of martyrdom posters created by HTS supporters

Since he was killed, Abu Khalid has not only been eulogized by HTS and its ideologue Abu Mariyah al-Qahtani, but also its military wing and media relations office as well as its local front group Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’abiyah and by the Salvation Government’s General Shura Council.